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Right-wing political parties are nothing new to Europe. However, there has been a 
rise and revitalization among far-right populist parties across Europe over the past two 
decades. This development does not appear to be a flash in the political pan but a 
manifestation of deeper trends.  
Contributing factors include perceived and actual economic hardships, anti-
immigrant sentiments, and perceived loss of autonomy under the European Union’s 
umbrella. This thesis analyzes Europe’s flirtations with populist parties and the current 
state of extreme right-wing parties in politics today. Specifically, it analyzes the United 
Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party to 
determine what the implications are for the success of a European identity becoming the 
normal status quo—and the consequences if it fails. 
The thesis concludes that should the extreme right parties continue in their 
successes, the EU would change radically or even disintegrate, with security implications 
for the United States. Specifically, if UKIP and AfD are influential in having Britain or 
Germany exit the EU, the European project of forging a common European identity 
among EU citizens would be a catastrophic failure and a notable problem for U.S. 
security, which relies on a stable, prosperous, and unified Europe. 
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. IMPORTANCE ..........................................................................................1 
B. RISE OF THE EXTREME RIGHT WING IN EUROPE .....................3 
1. United Kingdom Independence Party ..........................................5 
2. Alternative für Deutschland..........................................................8 
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES .....................12 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN .............................................................................12 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW AND SCOPE .....................................................13 
II. CONSTRUCTION OF A “EUROPE” ...............................................................15 
A. WHAT MAKES A EUROPEAN? ..........................................................16 
1. The Better West and Anti-Americanism ...................................20 
2. Institutions for “Europeanization” ............................................23 
B. RESISTANCE AND PROBLEMS .........................................................26 
1. Europe’s Integral Nationalist Past .............................................28 
2. Support for Populist Parties .......................................................30 
C. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................33 
III. THE UNITED KINGDOM INDEPENDENCE PARTY .................................35 
A. THE BRITISH INTRIGUE WITH RIGHT WING 
EXTREMISM ..........................................................................................35 
B. UKIP’S OBJECTIVES ............................................................................43 
C. DEMOGRAPHICS ..................................................................................45 
IV. THE ALTERNATIVE FÜR DEUTSCHLAND ................................................47 
A. THE FAR RIGHT IN THE FRG ...........................................................47 
B. AFD’S OBJECTIVES .............................................................................51 
C. DEMOGRAPHICS ..................................................................................53 
D. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................55 
V. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................57 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................63 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ...................................................................................69 
  
 viii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 ix 













Alternative fur Deutschland (Alternative for Germany) 
British Union of Fascists 
British National Party 
European Parliament 
European Central Bank 
European Union 
Front National 
Islamic state in Iraq and Syria 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom Independence Party 
 x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would be remiss if I did not express my sincere gratitude to Professor Carolyn 
Halladay for her infinite patience when reviewing this paper on many different occasions. 
Dr. Halladay’s mentorship and guidance were of incalculable worth in getting me to the 
finish line. Additionally, I owe a debt of thanks to Professor Donald Abenheim. His 
patience and expertise helped bring this thesis to a successful close. I know that each of 
you have important family obligations, and I sincerely appreciate the time you gave to 
my work in order to see it through. 
However, if I did not save my greatest praise for my wife, Alejandra, I would 
truly be a fool. During the development of this paper, she gave birth to our two sons. 
While I was on campus late at night and the weekend, she was dealing with diapers and 
tantrums. Life would be quite dull without you, and I would be still working on this 
paper. Thank you. 
  
 xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Not quite a decade after the European Union (EU) member states signed the 
Treaty of Lisbon1—the agreement that stands in for a European constitution after 
referenda throughout Europe derailed the planned the Constitutional Treaty (TCE)—the 
May 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections saw victory after victory delivered to 
populist and far-right parties whose platforms are largely, even exclusively, anti-Europe. 
These parties include the Front National in France, the United Kingdom Independence 
Party (UKIP) in Britain, the Alternative fur Deutschland (AfD) in Germany, and the 
Danish People’s Party in Denmark. At the same time, the established parties of the center 
lost dozens of seats, and some all but disappeared from the EP altogether.2 While the 
Eurocrats in Strassbourg and Brussels have mostly attempted to shrug off the results as 
protests within the otherwise happy context of European integration,3 the trend seems to 
predict dimmer future for the EU’s ambitions of a Europe “united in diversity.”4 Has 
Europe reached it political—and emotional—limits, granted the grand problems of the 
year 2015 with economic stagnation and security problems in the east and the south? 
A. IMPORTANCE 
This thesis examines the implications for the concept of a European identity for 
the citizens of the EU nations with the new success of populist, right-wing political 
groups in the new century. Specifically, the focus falls on the UKIP in Britain and the 
AfD in Germany, both of which made significant and startling inroads into the European 
political mainstream in the last several years. In the 2014 European Union elections, 
UKIP received 27.49 percent of the vote in the United Kingdom (UK), the first time in 
        1 “Further Expansion,” EUROPA, accessed June 15, 2014, http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-
history/2000- 2009/index_en.htm. 
2 Michael Thrasher, “European Elections: The Winner and Losers,” Sky News, May 26, 2014, 
http://news.sky.com/story/1269018/european-elections-the-winner-and-losers.  
3 Joshua Keating, “Can the Far Right in in Europe?” OregonLive, June 9, 2014, accessed June 16, 
2014, http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2014/06/can_the_far_right_win_in_europ.html.  
4 “The EU Motto,” EUROPA, accessed June 16, 2014, http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-
information/symbols/motto/index_en.htm.  
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more than a century that a party from outside the broad center, left or right, has won an 
election in Britain.5 UKIP’s campaign concentrated on spreading the message that Britain 
ought to leave the EU and establish tougher immigration policies to control the flow of 
refugees and others into the United Kingdom. In Germany, the AfD received 7 percent of 
the vote in the 2014 European Union elections, that is, it exceeded the 5 percent rule, and 
succeeded in “winning seats in the European Parliament for the first time”6 on its 
platform of an anti-euro monetary policy and tougher immigration control into Germany.  
To be sure, the UKIP and AfD are two prominent entries in contemporary right-
wing populist politics in Europe, but they are neither unique nor unusual, especially since 
the euro crisis of 2008–2014, when populist parties once again became prominent on the 
European electoral scene and in popular discourse. Today, especially amid the crush of 
migrants fleeing violence in Syria and poverty in Africa and South Asia, there is a 
growing discontent with the European Union among many countries in Europe that 
manifests itself in more and more organized and polished forms of populism. More 
disturbing is that these extreme populist parties are gaining support in many of the 
seemingly established pro-EU Western powers.7 While some of these parties have been 
on the political scene, at least on the fringes, for decades, their newfound power and 
prevalence, as a group of like-minded parties, is unprecedented in Europe since the 
earliest days of the EU and recalls the unhappy record of the interwar period. 
The United States has vested interests in maintaining a stable European political 
landscape for various reasons, not the least of which is the resurgent threat of Russian 
intervention along the former Soviet Union’s borders. Along the same lines, the United 
States relies on political stability in Europe, especially in light of the threats like radical 
5 “European Elections: UK Results,” Guardian, May 25, 2014, 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/ng-interactive/2014/may/25/european-elections-uk-results. 
6 “Germany’s Centre-Right Wins Election, Eurosceptics near 7%,” EurActiv, May 25, 2014, accessed 
June 2, 2014, http://www.euractiv.com/sections/eu-elections-2014/germanys-centre-right-wins-election-
eurosceptics-near-7-302378.  
7 Catherine Shoichet and Jim Boulden. “That ‘Earthquake’ in Europe? It’s Far-right Gains in 
Parliament Elections,” CNN, May 26, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/25/world/europe/eu-elections/. 
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Islamic groups, such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria8 (ISIS) and the Khorasan 
group.9 Instability in or among European NATO allies would be a clear signal to Russian 
leadership, and indeed all foreign adversaries, that the West is indeed weak and unable to 
respond to further Russian scheming, potentially allowing for miscalculations to be made. 
Thus, it is in the interest in the United States to maintain the status quo, more or less, in 
the event of a future coalition that is required to execute extended campaigns abroad. 
More disturbingly, sustained success by the radical right wing in Europe also may 
be a sign that the shared values and ideas that have united the transatlantic community 
may be faltering, or worse. The ascendance of radical right-wing groups among 
American allies in Europe ought to be a reminder to pay attention to the elections of 
America’s friends, for “a divorce between America and Europe is likely to be disastrous 
for order in world politics.”10 
B. RISE OF THE EXTREME RIGHT WING IN EUROPE 
The problem seems clear enough: the appeal of the extreme right wing and 
populist politics, particularly since the end of the Cold War and its impact on a security 
order that, more or less, has for a decade been devoid of an integral nationalist or fascist 
right-wing. In the interwar period (and perhaps even today), Fascism’s appeal was a call 
to action to the tens of millions who turned against democracy and pluralism: “Its 
[fascism’s] appeal was based more on action than dogma and had a strong performative 
[sic], aesthetic and affective aspect.”11 
As Jim Wolfreys writes: 
                                                 
8 “ISIS Fast Facts,” CNN, last modified September 23, 2014, 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/08/world/isis-fast-facts/.  
9 “What is the Khorasan Group?,” BBC News, last modified September 24, 2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29350271.  
10 Thomas Risse, “Sovereignty Puzzles,” in Integration in an Expanding European Union: 
Reassessing the Fundamentals, ed. Joseph. H. H. Weiler, Iain Blegg, and John Peterson (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2005), 338.  
11 Jim Wolfreys, “The European Extreme Right in Comparative Perspective,” in Varieties of Right 
Wing Extremism in Europe, ed. Andrea Mammone, Emmanuel Godin, and Brian Jenkins (107–121) (New 
York: Routledge, 2013).  
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In the post-war period parties gradually lost their mobilizing capacity and 
become more entwined with the state until, from the 1970s, this 
relationship began to change, so much so that some have argued that ‘the 
political party as a primary link between the society and the state 
disappeared and a vacuum was created.12 
But just what is populism in Europe? Jerome Jamin offers a definition:  
It can be said that populism refers to a political discourse placing the glory 
of the people in opposition to the corrupted elite, and that the former must 
take back control of the democracy that was confiscated by the latter. In 
the same way, it can be said that the extreme right is an ideological 
movement based on an extreme nationalism that is anxious to defend a 
given people in a given territory. A nationalism that justifies xenophobia, 
anti-Semitism, and the development of a strong police state to protect the 
future of that people from a racial, territorial and cultural point of view.13 
Hans-Georg Betz elaborates: 
Radical right-wing populist parties tend to distinguish themselves by their 
radical rejection of the established socio-cultural and sociopolitical 
system, their pronounced advocacy of individual achievement, a free 
marketplace, and drastic restrictions of the role of the state; their rejection 
of individual and social equality, their opposition to the social integration 
of marginalized groups and the extension of democratic rights to them, 
and their promotion of xenophobia, if not overt racism; their populist 
instrumentalization [sic] of diffuse public sentiments of anxiety, envy, 
resentment, and disenchantment, and their appeal to the allegedly superior 
common sense of the common people against the dominant cultural and 
political consensus.14 
Jamin speaks for Betz, as well, when he writes that the rejection of the “European 
programme has become central”15 and goes hand-in-hand with a perceived loss of 
sovereignty from the state to the EU.16 This viewpoint underlies the trend of anti-Europe 
parties running in European elections, as the case of UKIP and AfD demonstrate. 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 120. 
13 Jerome Jamin, “Two Different Realities: Notes on the Populism and the Extreme Right,” in 
Varieties of Right Wing Extremism in Europe, ed. Andrea Mammone, Emmanuel Godin, and Brian Jenkins 
(New York: Routledge, 2013), 41.  
14 Hans-Georg Betz, “The Two Faces of Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe,” The 
Review of Politics 55, no. 4 (1993): 664.  
15 Jasmin, “Two Different Realities,” 49. 
16 Ibid.  
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1. United Kingdom Independence Party 
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) first competed in the 1997 elections 
as “a largely unknown and disorganized fringe group of Eurosceptics.”17 Until recently, 
and perhaps even to this day, the party has been largely scorned at by mainstream 
political parties in Britain: “Prime Minister David Cameron once called them ‘fruitcakes, 
loonies and closet racists,’ and a cabinet minister, Kenneth Clarke, dismissed them last 
year as ‘clowns.’”18 UKIP did not help its own image with the ferocious and public 
infighting that took place among the party leadership in 2004.19 By 2013, however, the 
party was being written about in a more positive light, and perhaps of greater importance, 
more frequently. The party’s leader, Nigel Farange, who styles himself as a thoroughly 
British eccentric, was being lauded with congratulations for “having transformed ‘a rag 
tag and bobtail party into an effective political campaigning force.’”20 The perception 
that this is a protest party or a flash in the pan is changing. 
The strong results in the recent 2014 European Parliament elections have forced 
some critics to reassess just how to respond to the party’s growing popularity, as some 
have argued that the party is already making its mark on the political scene in the UK. 
The strength of the following it has built is forcing Mr. Cameron and his 
party to move further rightward, and compelling other mainstream parties 
to take account of the appeal its anti-elitist message has for economically 
stressed voters who might otherwise lean left.”21 
Support for UKIP seems to be growing out of voters who feel that there is a need 
being met by UKIP that the other mainstream parties are ignoring.22 Martin and Smith 
assert that Farange’s portrayal of himself as an “outsider unfairly excluded by a 
                                                 
17 Robert Ford, and Matthew Goodwin, Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right 
in Britain (New York: Routledge, 2014), 20.  
18 Stephen Castle, “Populist Party Gaining Muscle to Push Britain to the Right,” May 8, 2014, New 
York Times, accessed June 13, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/08/world/europe/populist-party-
gaining-muscle-to-push-britain-to-the-right.html?ref=world&_r=1.  
19 Ford, and Goodwin, Revolt on the Right, 49–52. 
20 Ibid., 9. 
21 Castle, “Populist Party Gaining Muscle.” 
22 Ford, and Goodwin, Revolt on the Right, 144. 
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members-only establishment club”23 reaches voters in a way that makes them feel like he 
is actually one of them, also left behind by the politicians in power—even though Ford 
and Goodwin point out that this sense of disenfranchisement is not especially new: 
“Wider trends in British society … showed how social and economic changes created a 
market for radical right politics among struggling ‘left behind’ voters.”24 Martin and 
Smith warn that the established parties ought to avoid mocking UKIP and its supporters 
lest this contempt “strengthen the feeling that those in power look down on those who are 
incompetent enough to think that the exclusion of their communities should actually 
matter.”25 
Immigration concerns are one of the key issues that UKIP supporters feel that the 
establishment has overlooked. Ford and Goodwin identify the support base for UKIP as 
“the older, whiter and poorly educated working class, who share strong feelings about 
national identity, Europe and immigration, and a lack of faith in established politics.”26 
This polity feels precarious and underrepresented, especially in connection with “Europe” 
and its integrative ideals, which all seem very far away and alien—and getting ever more 
distant as the literal and figurative complexion of Europe changes with migration. The 
UKIP manifesto for the 2014 European parliamentary elections reveals a common trend: 
a sense of complete loss of control and sovereignty to the EU.27 On its eight-page 
manifesto, the various headlines include “Lost Control of Our Borders,” “Public Services 
under Threat,” “Risk of Blackouts,” “Cutting and Controlling Immigration,” “Cheaper 
Petrol and Diesel,” and “Repairing the UK.”28 UKIP accuses current mainstream 
                                                 
23 Keir Martin, and Katherine Smith, “UKIP and the Rise of Populist Politics,” Anthropology Today 
30, no. 2 (2014): 1–2, http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8322.12107.  
24 Ford, and Goodwin, Revolt, 145. 
25 Martin, and Smith, “UKIP and the Rise of Populist Politics,” 2.  
26 Ford, and Goodwin, Revolt on the Right, 147. 
27 “UKIP European Manifesto 2014,” United Kingdom Independence Party, accessed November 5, 
2015, http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/themes/5308a93901925b5b09000002/ 
attachments/original/1398869254/EuroManifestoLaunch.pdf?1398869254, 1–8. 
28 Ibid., 4–7. 
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politicians of obeying orders from Brussels, to the point where there is no perceivable 
difference between any of the other parties.29 
Indeed, UKIP’s website describes today’s world as unsafe: “These are anxious 
and troubled times. As crisis follows crisis, our politicians do nothing in the face of 
dangers rearing up all around us.”30 The UKIP’s local manifesto for 2014 warns of 
“unlimited numbers of people”31 immigrating to the UK from Bulgaria and Romania. In 
the next bullet, the handout describes Romanians as being “second on the list of foreign 
nationals arrested by police for serious crimes.”32 UKIP’s six priorities for local elections 
are given (in order) as: Binding local referendums with five percent of the population 
demanding them; controlling housing developments, education and health services; 
prioritize public services for local residents; moving the government closer to the people; 
spending money on local issues instead of EU costs; and fighting crime and anti-social 
behavior.33 The implication is that the EU has afflicted Britain and the British with alien 
ideas and people who cannot be assimilated—while diverting attention and money from 
the hapless British everyman, who is increasingly disinclined to apologize for looking 
and sounding like John Bull. 
While the UKIP did not experience the success that it thought it might in 2015, a 
resurgence in future elections is not out of the question. As Ford and Goodwin write, 
there is a support base in the UK that does not feel any of the main parties are fighting for 
them.  
We [Ford and Goodwin] employed the term “left behind” to signal this 
broader sense of insecurity, pessimism and marginalization [sic] which 
characterizes [sic] the UKIP support base and sets it apart from backers of 
the other political parties. The majority of these voters no longer feel 
equipped to get by or get ahead in modern Britain and do not feel that the 
                                                 
29 Ibid.  
30 “UKIP Issues,” United Kingdom Independence Party, accessed June 13, 2014, 
http://www.ukip.org/issues.  
31 “UKIP Local Manifesto 2014,” United Kingdom Independence Party, 2.  
32 Ibid.  
33Ibid., 8. 
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mainstream parties can represent or respond effectively to this feeling of 
insecurity, which is why they are attracted to a radical alternative.34 
2. Alternative für Deutschland  
Alternative für Deutschland, the AfD party was founded in 2013 by Bernd Lucke, 
a Ph.D.-holding macroeconomist and professor at the University of Hamburg, and 
disillusioned former Christian Democrat.35 In a sense, the party arose from the relative 
political transformation of grand coalition governments, in which the normal Bonn 
Republic political landscape has fused with the Merkel chancellorship—the CDU/CSU 
and SPD in single cabinet. The party arose a as one-issue party concerned about the loans 
that Germany was distributing to Greece and other struggling EU members, it has gained 
popularity and expanded in the interim to tap into the radical right and neo Nazi political 
milieu, especially in the state of Saxony.36 The opinions of analysts about where AfD as 
a party truly stands and what it is about range from “a flash in the pan,”37 to the “German 
Tea Party,”38 to “Anti-European”39 and divided.40 Thus, AfD, too, can be classified as 
Euroskeptic, though the AfD has focused more criticism on the euro and a strong 
centralized EU instead of against the idea of integration within Europe itself.  
Following its successful European parliament campaign in 2014, some say that 
“the AfD is being seen by a growing number of voters as a legitimate, democratic party 
                                                 
34 Robert Ford, and Matthew Goodwin, “Different Class? UKIP’s Social Base and Political Impact: A 
reply to Evans and Mellon,” Parliamentary Affairs 1, no. 12 (April 2015), doi:10.1093/pa/gsv012.  
35 Barbara Supp, “Flirting with Populism: Is Germany’s AFD a Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?” Spiegel 
Online, May 22, 2014, accessed June 15, 2014 http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/a-portrait-of-
bernd-lucke-and-the-new-german-right-a-969589.html.  
36 Carsten Koschmieder. “An ‘Alternative für Deutschland?’” Policy Network, accessed June 16, 
2014, http://www.policy-network.net/pno_detail.aspx?ID=4497.  
37 “What is the Alternative?” The Economist, May 18, 2013, accessed June 13, 2014, 
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21578105-europe-waits-angela-merkel-faces-new-anti-
establishment-party-what-alternative.  
38 Gregg Benzow, “German AfD Tries to Shake Off ‘Tea Party’ Tag,” Deutsche Welle, May 21, 2014, 
accessed June 16 2014, http://www.dw.de/german-afd-tries-to-shake-off-tea-party-tag/a-17506323.  
39 Günther Lachmann, “AfDsiehtsich auf demWegzurVolkspartei [AFD Sees Itself on the Way to 
People’s Party]” Die Welt, Translated by Google, accessed June 14, 2014, 
http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article128403496/AfD-sieht-sich-auf-dem-Weg-zur-
Volkspartei.html.  
40 Koschmieder. “An ‘Alternative für Deutschland?’” 
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to the right of the [Christian Democratic Union, the party of Chancellor Angela Merkel], 
and less like a flash in the pan.”41 Adding to this sense of legitimacy is the recent 
inclusion of the AfD in British Prime Minister David Cameron’s faction within the EU 
parliament.42 Lucke has called the AfD members the “‘True Europeans’ and ‘the party of 
common sense.’”43 Following a power struggle in 2015, Lucke was ousted as the leader 
of AfD by his rival, also an academic and business woman, Frauke Petry, as she “won 60 
percent of the votes against her competitor”44 in the 2015 AfD party convention. Petry 
has been eager to embrace the Saxon PEGIDA movement, as well, a process that has 
moved the AfD much farther into the radical right wing camp, if not openly associating 
itself with neo Nazis. Comparing the two leaders, “Petry seeks to steer the party further to 
the right, while Lucke wants to adopt a more liberal, pro-business stance and is worried 
that his supporters are not being able to sufficiently distance themselves from the far-
right.”45 Ultimately, Lucke and some of his stalwart supporters left the AfD and formed a 
new party, the Alliance for Progress and Renewal (ALFA).46 In light of the Syrian 
migration crisis in Germany and the terror attacks in Paris in November 2015, Petry’s 
agenda seems likely to draw more attention—and more followers. 
In contrast to UKIP’s portrayal of itself as made up of average voters left behind 
by the privileged and established parties, the AfD leadership has been described as an 
over educated and over aged elite due to its membership demographics: “Its media-fueled 
profile is generally white, male, middle class, middle-aged, and educated—two-thirds of 
the initial membership held doctorates, with 86 percent of these male.”47 One writer 
                                                 
41 Noah Barkin, and Stephen Brown, “German Eurosceptics Go Mainstream in Threat to Merkel,” 
Reuters, June 15, 2014, accessed June 16, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2014/06/15/us-germany-eurosceptics-insight-idUSKBN0EQ0EG20140615.  
42 Ibid.  
43 Lachmann. “AfD siehtsich auf dem Wegzur Volkspartei.”  
44 “Germany’s Euroskeptic AfD Elects Conservative Leader Petry,” Deutsche Welle, July 4, 2015, 
accessed September 23, 2015, http://www.dw.com/en/germanys-euroskeptic-afd-elects-conservative-
leader-petry/a-18561912.  
45 Ibid. 
46 “German Eurosceptic Leader Lucke Sets up Alfa Party,” BBC News, July 20, 2015, accessed July 
20, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33593741.  
47 Benzow. “Germany AfD Tries to Shake off ‘Tea Party’ Tag.” 
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deemed AfD a “party of professors,”48 in no small part because of the high proportion of 
educators on its membership rolls. Such a thing echoes the process in the educated 
middle class of another epoch, especially in the interwar period, in which such persons of 
education and property associated themselves with anti-Weimar political parties. 
This constituency of professionals and establishment types makes, at first sight, 
an unlikely protest party. Arguably, they have only benefited from the policies and 
prosperity of the Europe that they now doubt. By the same token, the existence of 
extreme-right undercurrents within the AfD demographic may put rather a finer point on 
this analysis, and is cause for a great deal of concern. Carsten Koschmieder notes that 
many of the party activists had once been members of small right-wing 
extremist or anti-immigration parties. Right-wing extremist newspapers or 
online communities urge their readers to support the AfD. On the party’s 
Facebook page, for example, anti-Semitic or racist prejudices are often 
articulated by its supporters. Several influential party members have a 
record of making derogatory comments about foreigners, women or poor 
people.49 
The AfD, however, would prefer to characterize its supporters as “church-going 
traditionalists who believe in conservative family values, are deeply worried about the 
loose policies of the European Central Bank (ECB) and want Germany to cure its own 
ills rather than help its euro partners.”50 
The 2014 manifesto of the AfD’s European campaign was approved on 22 March 
2014. The preamble to the document begins with the statement:  
The Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) aims for a European Union (EU) 
of sovereign states. It rejects a European federal state on the model of the 
United States of America, because there is no European nation as such and 
no single European constitutive populace.51  
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Furthermore, the manifesto claims that the AfD desire an EU “which enduringly 
preserves the fundamental values of the Christian West.”52 
There are similarities to the UKIP manifestos, as the AfD also voices concerns 
over the centrality of the EU, the possible loss of sovereignty to Germany, and being 
dragged down in general by the poorer EU members:  
The success of European unity is also ever more threatened by the euro. 
The common currency sows the seeds of discord in the euro zone, because 
southern Europe is becoming impoverished and laying claim to the money 
of other countries in the north.53  
The AfD’s manifesto ends with a section called “Courage to Stand Up for 
Germany!” In this section, the party concludes its declaration against the current state of 
the EU with the following: “The AfD will change Europe for the better, because it will 
transform the established parties.”54 As events have continued to shake out following the 
2014 EP elections, forcing the mainstream parties to react and respond to the far right is 
ultimately changing the nature of their policies and as a result, moving the political 
discourse ever more to the right.55 
Similar to the UKIP, AfD’s political ambitions did not go according to plan, and 
the party failed to capture the larger share of votes in 2015. The party is far from done, 
however, as the political upheaval of the years 2014–2015 is fully in train and shows no 
signs of deceleration. The AfD still has seats in the European Parliament56 and has 
“representation in five German state assemblies after widening its appeal with populist 
positions on law and order, immigration and traditional social values.” All of these 
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platform points will likely resonate with more of the Germany voting public since the 
Paris attacks.57 
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
At least since 1992, the thrust of the European Union has been to become more 
than just the sum of its member states. The EU project continues to aspire to create the 
formation of a European identity; a “pan-European identity,”58 as one author has written. 
Perhaps this identity is even required for the EU to succeed in the long term. Certain 
developments suggest that this identity is well advanced in its creation, but the progress is 
uneven.  
The subtext of most of the concern about EU enlargement into the newly 
democratizing states of Central and Eastern Europe was whether or not the inhabitants of 
the former second world were European enough to embrace this necessary identity; the 
ongoing debate about Turkey’s candidacy for membership rests on the same question. In 
other words, a significant share of EU observers—whether they are Europhiles or 
Eurosceptic—seem to assume that there is some Eastern limit to the extent of Europe, 
both geographically and conceptually. Similarly, they assume that the question of a 
European identity has been settled in Western Europe. The advent of parties like UKIP 
and AfD—smaller parties, to be sure, but by no means any no longer considered fringe 
extremists—suggests that there may be distinct limits to the breadth or depth of a pan-
European identity, even in the established Western European democracies. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research design for this thesis is a comparative case study between the UKIP 
and the AfD that focuses on the successes of these parties mean for the European Union’s 
project today. Given the new and evolving nature of these two parties, this research will 
likely need to refer frequently to news articles, current events, and available peer 
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reviewed sources, utilizing scholarly articles as they continue to be developed and 
published. 
The UKIP was selected because of the special relationship that has developed 
since World War I and II between the UK and the America. The AfD was chosen as a 
comparison because it is the first anti-euro group to gain momentum in Germany in 
decades. There appears to be an underlying need or want that the EU has not fulfilled, 
and these groups may embody the discontent that is being felt by populations in Europe. 
Dismissing these groups as merely radical or crazy would be a mistake on the part of the 
Western governments, as the appeal for these types of political parties is growing. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW AND SCOPE 
This thesis is organized as follows: The first substantive chapter discusses how 
the EU has tried to develop a European identity among its member states and to what 
extent that has succeeded and failed. The second chapter provides an overview of the 
history of populism in Europe. The third and fourth chapters discuss the platforms, 
supporters, and other details of the UKIP and the AfD, respectively. Contrasting these 
two political parties with the attempts by the EU to create a pan-European identity, either 
through politics or economics, will help show the reader where some policies have 
succeeded and where they have failed. The conclusion makes sense of what the gains 
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II. CONSTRUCTION OF A “EUROPE” 
To avoid the horrors of another war in Europe, the western European and Atlantic 
powers that emerged from the rubble of World War fashioned a concept of anti-
nationalism and continental unity, which had been a rallying cry in earlier epochs. The 
ancient blood feuds and dynastic rivalries as well as total wars had only escalated over 
150 years prior, and the unity that had defeated the Axis had to be preserved and fortified. 
Core to this idea was a reconciliation across the Rhine between France and Germany. 
Thus, how remarkable that these two historic enemies are now the cornerstones of the 
European Union. Attempts to neutralize this enmity occurred following World War II, 
largely to set about to interlock the industrial might of France and West Germany, along 
with neighboring countries. The Coal and Steel Union in 1951 soon led to the Common 
Market in 1957, and each country was involved. Gerhard Bebr writes, “By creating a 
common productive unit and market for coal and steel, the participating States have 
pooled resources representing fifteen percent of their industrial production and 
constituting two-thirds of the world’s steel exports.”59  
The European Union of 2015 began as the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC). The ECSC was founded in 1951 with the original goal of preventing another 
war between France and Germany: “Determined to prevent another such terrible war, 
European governments concluded that pooling coal and steel production would—in the 
words of the Declaration—make war between historic rivals France and Germany ‘not 
merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.’”60 In first the former and then the latter 
form, it has remained a primarily “Franco-German consortium, a series of arrangements 
designed to ensure that France and Germany will not again go to war by inducing them to 
merge their institutions and economies to a point where this eases to be possible.”61 
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Increased standards of living over the past 60 years in the majority of EU member states 
have made the chances of war between members of the EU much less likely. Indeed, “it’s 
hard to imagine war in today’s Europe, which has coalesced around democratic 
values.”62 Speaking of the EU elections in 2014, Paul Krugman continues: “The 
Parliament has very limited powers, but its mere existence is a triumph for the European 
idea.”63 
Yet the material benefits provided by the ECSC and its later incarnations—the 
European Economic Community (EEC), the European Community (EC), and the EU—
represent only part of the final goal for the proponents of European political union. 
According to the Council of the European Union, the commonality among European 
states that 
draw[s] inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of 
Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable 
and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality 
and the rule of law, [and] recall[s] the historic importance of the ending of 
the division of the European continent and the need to create firm bases 
for the construction of the future Europe.64 
In other words, the ultimate goal of the EU is forging a common European political 
identity to supplant and perhaps supersede existing national identities.  
A. WHAT MAKES A EUROPEAN? 
Which mechanisms are being used to pursue this goal? And what commonalities 
comprise a “European?” As Risse might say, certain clear “European values” emerge.65 
First, there is an obvious adherence to democracy and human rights. Walter Laqueur 
explains: 
The postwar generation of European elites aimed to create more-
democratic societies. They wanted to reduce the extremes of wealth and 
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poverty and provide essential social services in a way that prewar 
government had not. They wanted to do all this not just because they 
believed that it was morally right but because they saw social equity as a 
way to temper the anger and frustrations that had led to war.66  
Continuing along the theme of European reluctance to commit further crimes 
against humanity as much as possible, Jos De Beus states, “government and peoples [of 
the EU] ought to pursue the enforcement of the humane morale minimum.”67 De Beus 
explains that “this minimum implies that member states respect human rights in their own 
country and under their own power as much as possible.”68 Preventing human rights 
abuses is certainly is a large part of what the EU has sought to accomplish within its own 
borders, though the same cannot be said for the atrocities along the EU’s borders in the 
Balkans in the 1990s. In this way, Jos De Beus illuminates where some of the perceived 
borders of where “Europe” actually may lie:  
Furthermore, these states renounce aggressive war, on European territory 
to start with. They help fellow Europeans in any struggle against 
barbarism. And they commit themselves in international treaties and 
organizations to the pursuit of decent and just peace and security, and to 
additional humanitarian obligations outside Europe and its sphere of 
influence”69  
Not perceiving the Balkans as really being a part of ‘Europe’ may also be one of 
the reasons why the atrocities there were allowed to happen for so long. Regardless, these 
are elements that the EU strives to pursue within its own borders as the very least. 
Second, a strong sense of the rule of law and equality is present. Laqueur states 
that 
among the European values and fundamental rights most often mentioned 
were the respect for human dignity, the rule of law, peace, respect for the 
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environment, perhaps above all, tolerance—the great diversity of 
European culture and the willingness to accept it.70  
This characteristic, along with the commitment to democracy, represents a self-
conscious reference to—and rejection of—the atrocities committed during the Second 
World War and perhaps even of the totalitarian regimes that ruled to the East of the Iron 
Curtain. Somehow, the embrace of tolerance as a complete about-face against the horrors 
committed in Europe over the past 100 years has allowed an cultural and social 
environment to thrive where a once conservative Christian culture has since embraced an 
artist like Conchita Wurst (real name Thomas Neuwirth),71 a homosexual man who 
dresses in drag and was voted Europevision’s most popular pop music artist in 2014.72 
Indeed, the legacy of World War II (and, perhaps even more so after Ukrainian 
developments the past two years, the Cold War) is central within a European identity, 
even if may have faded somewhat over time and generations in Western Europe’s 
nations. 
Third, the average European Union citizen has come to expect a certain 
prosperous and socially assured standard of living. Marta Kuc writes, “Nowadays the 
standard of living has an increasing role in the European Union integration process.”73 It 
is no wonder that thousands upon thousands of immigrants and refugees attempt to flood 
into the EU every year; there are widely developed roads and infrastructure, readily 
available medical services, and a vast library of leisure activities to select from.74 Kuc 
notes, “It is worth mentioning that the access to higher-order goods, including the culture, 
is an indicator of increased standard of living.”75 Migrants aside, these real and imagined 
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benefits have been a huge allure to many former Soviet-bloc states that have sought and 
successfully joined the EU over the past 25 years.  
There are still other traits that make up the compositions of the generic European 
Everyman or Everywoman. He or she is likely not very religious save for the socially 
mandatory holiday service, but will probably identify as a Christian.76 This number will 
only decrease by 2050 as more Europeans are expected to continue the trend of coming 
“religiously unaffiliated,”77 projected to be 23 percent by 2050.78 Education is abundant 
and correlates well with those Europeans who tend to associate with the EU concept in 
general.79 With wide-ranging access to the work force and other opportunities for “self-
fulfillment,” EU women have a fertility rate of 1.6 per woman.80 Much of the 
population’s growth in Europe has to do with immigration with up to two million coming 
to Europe every year.81 The EU at large is committed to green energy, and it does so 
“from a wide variety of sources including wind, solar, hydro, tidal, geothermal, and 
biomass.”82 Spending on infrastructure and social projects are preferred to spending 
significantly on defense, which is generally left to NATO and the Americans. National 
rivalries seem to peak mostly during soccer matches and when interstate debts become 
problematic to repay. 
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1. The Better West and Anti-Americanism 
To a certain degree among some proponents of Europe as a third path and as an 
Anti-Anglo Saxon, neo liberal block, anti-Americanism is now considered a composite of 
the general European attitude. As Andrei Markovits writes:  
Ambivalence, antipathy, and resentment toward and about the United 
States have comprised an important component of European 
culture…Animosity toward the United states migrated from the periphery 
and disrespected fringes of European politics and became a respectable 
part of the European mainstream…These negative sentiments and views 
have been driven not only—or even primarily—by what American does, 
but rather by an animus against what Europeans have believed that 
America is. Anti-Americanism has been a core element, indeed at times a 
dominant one, among European elites for centuries.83 
Certainly, the events of the 2003 U.S. unilateral invasion of Iraq, use of drone 
strikes and enhanced interrogation tactics, and continued operations in Afghanistan to 
2015 have further strained American and European politicians to some degree, which 
appears in the common discourse of the day among those social and political groups who 
have been habitually anti American since former times.  
Philippe Roger adds that anti-Americanism is not simply about the political 
aspect; it is a discourse. According to Roger: 
After all, a discourse is … a way of ‘running here and there.’ Anti-
Americanism is an unbridled discourse, not only because it is rife with 
irrationality and bubbling with humors, but also because it takes an 
essayistic form, rather than that of a dissertation or demonstration.84  
Tracing the long history of French anti-Americanism and pessimism, Roger asserts that 
this sentiment is not even truly based in facts or evidence, but instead it is now a “cultural 
pillar”85 that certain French on the left and the right can see as a cultural “other.” 
Reasoning for this comes from the French “resigned dependency on American for goods 
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and commerce and finally to the fear of America’s global domination in light of France’s 
thwarted imperial ambitions.”86 This notion in a way has become to some extent a part of 
European thinking at large, especially among such groups as UKIP and AfD.  
Despite the intriguing anti-Americanism in European political discourse, Victoria 
de Grazia points out that there is a powerful American infiltration of European culture 
through commercialization, in all manner of retail of consumer good and in the definition 
of class on an American basis and not that of the tradition estates or even classes as seen 
by Marx. McDonald’s, as a case in point, serves to illustrate that although Europeans may 
tend to view American politics as distasteful, there is an undeniable appeal for American 
products:  
The food at McDonald’s was a matter of indifference. It was the cultural 
associations that made for its appeal: the bright lights and noise; the 
milling of tourists and other outsiders; colorful employee uniforms; the 
absence of adult mediators like waiters; the self-service and open seating; 
the tie-ins with familiar Disney cartoons and Coca-Cola; the familiarity of 
the company mascot, the red-haired clown Ronald McDonald, said to be 
the world’s most widely known figure after Jesus; and the small toys 
handed out for free to the children.87 
Thus, even in the face of the inherent skepticism of America the political entity, there 
was a strong attraction to the cultural undertones of American society and product in 
Europe, shown by the rapid expansion of McDonald’s throughout Europe in the 1980s.  
As an example of traditional left wing and intellectual anti Americanism, Jürgen 
Habermas expresses his opinion about what he believes some of the core European 
values are. Contrary to American politicians proclaiming a deep faith (typically of the 
Christian variety), “In Europe, a president who begins his official functions every day 
with a public prayer and connects his momentous political decisions with a divine 
mission is difficult to imagine.”88 Religion is typically treated “apolitically”89 in 
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European politics, however with the immigration problems of 2015, conversations about 
Islam are certainly becoming more common. European citizens generally expect that their 
governments will help “compensate [citizens] for market failures”90 in times of 
fluctuations with the free market. Continuing with this reasoning, Habermas explains: 
In Europe, the long-enduring impacts of class differences were 
experienced by those affected as a fate that only collective action could 
prevent. Thus, against the background of the labor movement and the 
traditions of Christian social thought, a solidary ethos of struggle for 
greater social justice aimed at universal welfare prevailed over an 
individualistic ethos of performance-based justice that accepts the 
inevitability of gross social inequalities.91 
Never forgetting the horrors of the holocaust, Europeans have developed “a heightened 
sensitivity for violations of personal and bodily integrity … reflected … in the fact that 
the Council of Europe and the EU have made the rejection of the death penalty a criterion 
of membership.”92 As Europeans have looked on their past with a self-critical eye on the 
topic of colonialism and militarism, the “conviction that the domestication of the state’s 
use of violence also calls for a reciprocal restriction of the scope of sovereignty at the 
global level.”93 This position can help explain the EU’s apparent mandate that the UN 
Security Council give an approval before military action is taken abroad, and the 
indignation at the U.S. for not waiting for one prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.  
Risse argues there are other characteristics the average EU supporter possesses, 
but specifically cosmopolitanism. He writes that “those who identify with Europe are 
more likely than others to hold cosmopolitan values, have positive attitudes towards 
immigrants, and place themselves politically more to the left than to the right on the 
respective scale.”94 He adds that  
there is a high probability that these attitudes come in a bundle, that is, that 
Europeans with cosmopolitan values also identify with Europe as part of 
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these attitudes. Statistical data on a newly emerging cultural cleavage in 
Europe lends strong support to this argument. Accordingly, pro-European 
attitudes load heavily on the cosmopolitan end of this cleavage, while 
Euroskepticism is part and parcel of the nationalist end.95  
Finally, Floria Pichler provides some research results regarding cosmopolitanism 
in Europe: 
Research has shown that individual characteristics and contextual 
conditions shape cosmopolitanism and other orientations to a considerable 
degree. Younger people, the better educated, and people in 
professional/managerial occupations are more likely to see themselves as 
European or world citizens. Contextual variables are important criteria to 
distinguish between people. Where experience with differences is most 
likely, such as in big cities, people are more likely to see themselves as 
cosmopolitans. Most importantly, personal experience, as in living abroad, 
was decisive in influencing identities and wider orientations including 
attitudes and perceptions of the EU. This is a clear sign that diversity does 
not appeal to everybody in the same way but that ‘personal involvement’ 
(voluntary cosmopolitanism) plays a crucial role.96 
In sum, these characteristics are the base values of what has come to be accepted as traits 
of a common European identity.  
2. Institutions for “Europeanization” 
Two words characterize the EU’s attempt to forge a pan-European identity: 
Europeanization and interdependence. Europeanization is defined by Risse, Cowles, and 
Caporaso as:  
the emergence and development at the European level of distinct 
structures of government, that is, of political, legal, and social institutions 
associated with political problem solving that formalize interactions 
among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of 
authoritative European Rules.97  
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Spanning the policy areas of gender equality (in terms of pay and other realms), 
telecommunications, the judiciary systems across the EU members states, business 
practices, and even citizenship, Europeanization has been perhaps at the heart of EU 
motivations all along. 
According to Richard Hermann, “Interdependence is an unavoidable reality in the 
modern world.”98 Moreover, it is a reality for anyone who spends any time in traffic in 
central Europe today as in contrast to the same roads approximately 30 years ago. 
Understanding that the EU is built on interdependence, institutions have been constructed 
in order to promote a larger European identity in various ways. Herrmann, Brewer, Risse 
write that over time, institutions can gain trust of the members participating in it, and 
therefore can be successful whether or not the individual members necessarily have large 
amounts of trust in one another.99 The authors describe an alternative purpose of these 
institutions besides just regulating affairs, be they economic or otherwise: “to promote 
the construction of an overarching common identity among the participating subgroups. 
The institutional form in this case [talking about the EU] is a supranational unit, with 
participating nations as constituent parts.”100  
For the British and Germans, given their respective political cultures and their 
experiences of constitutions and government in the past, each country has a unique view 
of “Europe” and the EU. Using the case of adopting the Euro as a currency or not, both 
the British and Germans obviously reached different conclusions on whether or not to do 
so. Going back for centuries, the British have long maintained an arm length relationship 
with Europe, intervening when necessary to prevent any one continental power from 
amassing too much influence, but otherwise withdrawing back to the isles when the 
conflict was over. The case of the euro was little different. Especially in the view of the 
Little England partisan, the British have rarely if ever considered themselves European, 
even if there is a certain understanding that they share an interdependence with the 
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continent. For the British, joining the euro would bring catastrophic costs—and not just 
economic ones:  
The British debate on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the 
continuing reluctance to join the single currency must be understood with 
reference to a stable national identity collectively shared by the political 
elites. The dominant discourse strengthened the opponents of the single 
currency who regularly used identity arguments to make their point. They 
feared that Britain would lose the ability to govern itself and argued 
against any further losses of national sovereignty. The political discourse 
centered around whether to join later or not, in sharp contract with the 
debated in Germany, which concentrated on joined now or later.101 
For Germany, joining the EMU served as a means to achieve separation from its 
ugly Nazi past in the first half of the 20th century. Risse writes, “German elite support for 
the single currency was based on the Germany post-World War II European identity, 
whose purpose was to overcome the Germany nationalist and militarist past once and for 
all.”102 Contrary to British elites, political parties in West Germany, and later a united 
Germany, never had any doubts about their support for the Euro.103 Risse shows that 
then-German Chancellor Kohl, echoing Konrad Adenauer, presented the argument in a 
way that left little to no room for opponents to argue against integration and adoption of 
the single currency, saying it was a “question of war and peace:”104 
Support for the euro = support for European integration = good Europeans 
= good Germanness = rejection of the German militarist and national 
past.105 
In looking at the case of the euro, it is clear that national identities play a major 
role in the decision to adopt a more independent and nationalist attitude, or a more 
Europeanized one: 
With regard to both the British and German cases, collective identities—
Englishness as non-Europeanness[sic], in one case, and Germany 
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Europeanness[sic], in the other—largely influenced how political elites 
came to see their economic interests with regard to European integration 
in general and EMU in particular. In these two cases, collective identities - 
whether national or Europeanized—do a large part of the causal work in 
explaining the particular ways in which the elites in both countries came to 
view British and German interests.106  
B. RESISTANCE AND PROBLEMS 
Attempts to forge any kind of common identity among the varied cultures in 
Europe would lead to winners and losers emerging, and thus resistance. This process 
proceeded from the 1950s until the 1990s on the solid progress of Western Europe and of 
the FRG at the lead. National unity and the end of the cold war led to the further phase of 
consolidation, which, as of 2008, has now entered into a period of crisis. In the news for 
much of 2014 and 2015, the Greek debt problem has been a crippling issue for the EU. 
How far the EU should be able to go in executing measures for member countries to 
reform their financial infrastructure has been certainly playing out in front of the world’s 
eyes. Immigration has been a constant source of strife, yet only recently have the central 
and northern EU members had to start sharing the burden. Violence by Muslim radicals 
has only fueled tensions within those groups skeptical of the EU project’s success at all. 
Even a democracy like the United States has not fully solved these kinds of issues, and 
most people would agree the United States is only one country; the EU has many, and the 
issues are not simple in nature.  
As discussed earlier, there is, on one hand, a certain sense of what “Europe”107 is:  
EU Europe represents a modern, political entity encompassing liberal 
values such as democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and the market 
economy. Modern Europe’s ‘others’ are the continents own past of 
militarism and nationalism, but also xenophobia and racism.”108  
This notion has been forwarded and promoted by the elites and politicians at large within 
member countries of the EU.  
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Yet there is also competing and contrary narrative of what “Europe”109 ought to 
be: in the view of a Europe that is much older and was also prevalent in Hitler’s time,  
‘Nationalist Europe’ emphasizes a (Western) civilization and culture with 
references to a common historical heritage, strong national traditions, 
Christians as its core religion, and clear geographical boundaries. National 
Europe’s ‘others’ are non-Christian countries such as Turkey, but also 
non-European immigrants and large parts of the Muslim populations in 
European cities.110  
This sentiment has found its contemporary expression in UKIP and the AfD, whose 
appeal to contemporary sentiment cloaks a highly retrograde political idea. 
But who subscribes to the idea of “Europe” to begin with? As Risse explains that 
in general,  
If you are Italian, Spanish, French, or German, you are more likely to 
belong to the group of inclusive nationalists who also identify with Europe 
than if you are Swedish, Finnish, or British. In general, the populations of 
continental Western and Southern Europe (except for Greece) feel 
comparatively more attached to Europe than Northern Europeans or 
Central Eastern Europeans.111  
Risse also mentions a study by Neil Fligstein and David Green that “show[s] age, 
education, income, and socioeconomic status in general are strong predictors for 
European identity.”112 It should therefore come as little surprise that having superior 
education and frequent interactions with other countries (and knowing a second 
language) only helps to reinforce the pro-Europe stance for those Europeans who do so. 
But that is not exactly an option open to every person in the EU. Traveling and advanced 
education may have some prohibitive costs, thereby closing the door to those on the 
lower end of the socioeconomic scale of the public. Unfortunately, have these kinds of 
international interactions and experiences can be very expensive, and thus limits the 
number of people who can send their children abroad for studying or other excursions. As 
                                                 
109 Ibid.  
110 Ibid.  
111 Ibid., 46.  
112 Ibid.  
 28 
Risse says above, it is a primarily elite driven idea, the idea of Europe. This scenario is 
where the roots of resistance to the whole EU concept begin to grow. 
1. Europe’s Integral Nationalist Past 
Resistance to immigration and the “other” constitutes a norm in the record of 
Europe. Nationalism since the eighteenth century, if not before, has always had an 
opponent, an “other,” to consolidate the nation, especially since the turn in nationalism in 
the 1880s that led to the world wars. Since the end of World War II, there have been a 
number of these populist groups in western Europe who have come into existence and 
ebbed and flowed in terms of popularity, such as the Front National in France, the British 
National Party in Britain, Alleanza Nazionale in Italy, the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs 
in Austria, and the NPD in the FRG. “Their agenda is opposed to immigration, political 
and economic integration, international capitalism, globalization, and current 
socioeconomic and political systems, and is pro-national identity.”113 Ian Bremmer adds, 
“[Marine] Le Pen has shown Europe’s radical right that a little rebranding can mask a 
long history of xenophobic ugliness,”114 opening the door for more mainstream support 
than ever before.  
Jos De Beus describes what populism means and contrasts it with pragmatism. He 
writes: 
Political scientists draw a distinction between populism by outsiders with 
a claim to representation of oppressed and excluded members of the polity 
(grassroots populism) and populism by insiders with a claim to use of the 
state apparatus in accordance with the will of ordinary citizens 
(government house populism). Some argue that stable liberal democracies 
are marked by alternation of populism and pragmatism (Hirschman 1982; 
Unger 1987; Notermans 2000). Pragmatism is non-populism in the sense 
of continuation of rational public policy, liberal pluralism (respect for 
minorities and dissidents), elitist administration of the nation state, politics 
as professional business insulated from the cycle and buzz of elections, 
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and control of the public by means of mitigating rhetoric and moderation. 
Populism will be articulated by new politicians seeking office via 
offensive campaigning and radical change, and by old politicians whose 
office holding is losing the support of major constituencies and who stick 
to power by defensive campaigning and preservation of the status quo. 
Pragmatism will be articulated by cooperative and flexible leaders of 
opposition parties as well as by incumbent politicians whose office is both 
vested and popular.115 
De Beus goes further into defining what populism means on its own:  
Populism is a technical term for mobilization of resistance against a ruling 
class alias establishment, pursuit of absolute majority rule (with contempt 
of deliberation and compromise), display of popular and militant 
nationalism, electoral opportunism (following polls and the given policy 
preferences of relevant voters), and manipulation of the public—either 
stirring up dangerous emotions of the crowd or pleasing an irrational 
crowd.116  
De Beus describes a common criticism by the far right of the EU’s political 
process, namely the lack of trust by common citizens in the EU and the growing lack of 
national governments to assert their wills: 
According to the thesis of the democracy deficit, European politics suffers 
from failing and missing modes of democratic mobilization, delegation, 
contest, deliberation, choice and accountability. The authority of the 
European Parliament is weak, due to its limited grip on regulatory and 
budgetary actions of the European Council and the European Commission, 
the embryonic nature of political cleavages and parties in a pan-European 
space, and endemic internal corruption. The authority of national 
parliaments is hollowed out, due to sovereignty pooling, informational 
time-lags, and the tension between effective diplomacy in European 
networks and parliamentary binding of national ministers… The deficit 
engenders popular alienation. The gap between the growing capacity and 
impact of the European regulatory regime and the limited commitment of 
ordinary citizens in the European Union leads to disbelief, indifference 
and hostility with respect to European policies.117 
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2. Support for Populist Parties 
Roger Eatwell explores several different theses that shed light onto the support 
base of right wing extremism in Europe. First, the single-issue thesis “implies that 
extreme right parties will do especially well at times when there are major concerns about 
new immigration.”118 This observation is especially relevant considering the immense 
immigration problem the EU countries have been attempting to deal with during the 
summer and fall of 2015. Second, the protest thesis postulates “anti-politics as the key 
factor explaining the rise of the extreme right.”119 Voters may vote for one of the parties 
on the extreme right as a way to “express discontent with the mainstream parties” in their 
respective government, and not necessarily as full-fledged support of the party’s entire 
platform.120 Third, the social breakdown thesis states that the breakdown of “traditional 
social structures, especially those values based on class and religion, are breaking down” 
may be a factor in citizens supporting extremist parties purporting to defend these 
perceived traditional values, which may be as simple keeping women in the house or 
anti-homosexuality.121  
Ultimately, Eatwell proposes his own theory for extreme right-wing support that 
is based on three areas of perception converging: a growing perception of legitimacy in 
extremist groups, rising personal efficacy, and a decline in trust in the political systems 
that be.122 Extremist groups can increase their ability to be seen as legitimate and 
acceptable most commonly “by creating the impression that it is a legitimate part of the 
national tradition. Careful packaging of policies can help.”123 Repackaging policies can 
involve “watering down” issues, for example “reducing immigration rather than totally 
banning it.”124 This view may make extremist parties rather more attractive to the 
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mainstream of society, as it may not be expounding blatantly racist or xenophobic ideas. 
Copsey reinforces this point: “Moreover, rather than ‘single issue’ anti-immigrant 
electors and no one else, the electorates of right-extremist parties contain ‘both extreme 
right/xenophobic supports and diffuse anti-party protestors.”125 Eatwell argues that an 
increase self-efficacy can be fueled through group membership and power leaders within 
the party.126 Last, trust “refers to the feelings about the ability of the economic and 
political system to deliver desired goods.”127 Failure of the political system to deliver on 
promises, appear inept, get caught up in scandals, and petty infighting with no realize 
achievements being perceived by the public all further erode public trust in the system,128 
making extremist parties look both decisive and attractive in comparison. 
Wilcox, Weinberg, and Eubank propose:  
These findings suggest that the far-right vote has shown the greatest 
increase … in socially and economically conservative nations whose 
highly individualized citizens express low levels of trust in others, and 
dissatisfaction with the direction their lives have taken. They are also 
prepared to express ‘moral indignation’ at the failings of others but no 
themselves and do not wish to have as neighbors people of different 
backgrounds. In addition, the countries where these qualities are most 
prevalent—Austria, Belgium, France, and Italy—appear to be high 
contentious societies. There is widespread disagreement over important 
social values as well as in the economic and political realms. Strikes and 
other labor stoppages are common phenomena, while governments come 
and go at a substantially faster than normal pace. Moreover, the narrowly 
self-interested members of the various governments seem to have 
considerable difficulty in getting along with one another… all these traits 
leave us with the impression of a not so silent counter-revolution against 
growing social pluralism and institutional weakness.129  
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The common theme with the far right’s support base is concern over the future 
and how their own country and individual situation will fare in an increasingly more 
globalized world. Goodwin and Ford write:  
Since the collapse of communism and the Maastricht treaty, which 
accelerated political integration, the radical right has turned against the 
European project, attacking the EU as a threat to national sovereignty and 
identity. Popular opposition to the EU has now become an important 
driver of radical right support, leading some to conclude that radical right 
parties are now a decisive force in swaying popular opinion against 
Europe by mobilizing the growing uncertainties about the future of 
European integration among the mass public.130  
Bremmer expands on this concept by writing:  
Despite all their bluster, the migration crisis is a godsend for Europe’s far 
right: it gives both new and older parties an opening to capitalize on the 
rising fear of voters that might never otherwise consider supporting them. 
As ultra-nationalists who want to protect the strong welfare systems their 
citizens currently enjoy, they frequently couch their criticism of migrants 
in terms of economic pragmatism, explaining there is simply not enough 
money and jobs to go around. Though these parties often have extensive 
histories of racist comments and policy proposals, their economic message 
now resonates across a continent exhausted by multiple crises in recent 
years.131 
The economist’s article Trouble in Labourland perhaps captures the phenomena 
most succinctly: 
 Excessive this may be, but playing out on the streets of Oldham is a story 
repeated across Europe; a suspicion of political elites borne of stagnant 
living standards, doubts about globalisation[sic] borne of 
deindustrialization[sic] and in particular hostility to immigration borne of 
shifting demographics and pressures (however unrelated) on housing, 
wages and services. Support for nativist parties, ranging from Britain’s 
blokeish UKIP to France’s hard-right National Front and Hungary’s 
overtly racist Jobbik, is squeezing traditional social democratic parties 
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more comfortable discussing redistributive social policies than flags, 
nationhood and identity.132 
What is the common theme for explaining the far-right surge in recent years? As long as 
there is reasonable fear and uncertainty about how positively or negatively the EU’s 
influence will be on individual countries, there will always be a support base for radical 
right wing parties to rally. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The far right continues to gain in popularity across Europe in the face of political 
and economic crises since 2008. Economic problems within the EU and global economy 
coupled with the ever present and constantly growing immigration influx (which is, as of 
2015, a full blown crisis with no clear solution) from North Africa and Middle East will 
present opportunities for extremist parties to make inroads into the electoral landscape. If 
confidence in the political system of the Europe Union continues to be questioned by the 
extremist parties, these forces will play a more prominent role in politics, as is already the 
case in the German political scene.  
No one is able to see the future, but this trend has implications for the strength of 
European political unity and, thereby, for U.S. security and defense policy in the midst of 
multiple crises. The potential for a radical change of the EU’s policies, member countries 
exiting the EU, and perhaps even integrity of the EU could be realized in the coming 
decades given the right conditions described above. Failure of the EU’s government to 
maintain confidence would potentially spell doom for the prospect of a European 
identity. If elected leaders continue to fail to properly address the concerns of these 
disaffected voters, UKIP and its likeminded ilk may someday soon see themselves as 
major players in government decision making, far from the fringes where they started.  
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III. THE UNITED KINGDOM INDEPENDENCE PARTY 
Britain had a long-standing history of radical or extreme right wing political 
parties prior to 1939 and in its post-World War II period. What is important about the 
United Kingdom Independence Party is that it is the first and only far right political group 
to have won a British EU election, garnering 27.49 percent of the British vote in the 2014 
EU election.133 While the party did not do as stunningly well in the 2015 national 
elections, it still gained one seat in the parliament and 12.6 percent of the vote overall, up 
from the last elections 9.5 percent.134 While this result is not exactly the explosion of 
support the party and its leaders may have been hoping for, it is a clear signal to the 
establishment that the party is not going to fade away with time as some rivals wished. 
As the current UKIP leader, Nigel Farange, has said, “UKIP is not a pressure group. It is 
not a spin-off of the Conservative Party. It is a new political force, and it is here to 
stay.”135 This chapter explores where this party originated, what it stands for, who 
supports it, and why it matters. 
A. THE BRITISH INTRIGUE WITH RIGHT WING EXTREMISM 
The British Isles have never been entirely “European” in the sense that has been 
either France or Germany. Metaphorically and geographically, the English Channel and 
the North Atlantic form a barrier that represents the traditional hesitation of the British 
involve themselves too much in Continental affairs. This ambivalence has carried over to 
Britain’s relationship with the EU. Indeed, in 1960, the British brought together several 
European states as the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which was conceived 
as an alternative to the EEC.136 At the same time, British interests in joining the EEC 
were rebuffed by Charles de Gaulle, who remained suspicious of the Anglophone allies’ 
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dedication to Europe.137 Only de Gaulle’s death in 1970 cleared the way for Britain’s 
membership in the EEC (in 1973). Already in 1975, the British electorate was asked to 
affirm the country’s willingness to remain affiliated with Europe, as the EEC styled itself. 
While the referendum showed a significant majority in favor of EEC membership for the 
UK, the fact that the new government felt compelled to ask is symptomatic of Britain’s 
abiding skepticism of European institutions.  
Since the end of World War II, there have been various right wing extremist 
groups, all varying in duration and impact (if any). In fact, from the 1930s until the 
present day, there have been more than 75 far right-wing extremist groups or political 
parties in the UK.138 And just like in America prior to the outbreak of World War II, 
Britain had more than a small minority of Fascist Germany supporters in its ranks: “‘The 
British ‘Establishment’, including key figures in the aristocracy, the press [sic] were keen 
supporters of Hitler up until the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Few were supporters of 
Nazism, but they admired Hitler and felt he offered the best means of preventing the 
spread of communism. They tended to turn a blind eye to anti-Semitism and the attacks 
Hitler made on communists, socialists, and other internal opponents.”139 The author 
continues:  
British high society had a ’30s love affair with Nazism and Hitler which 
was in many cases just as profound as that which the German people 
experienced at the same time. When they looked at Hitler, many who had 
an affection for Germany liked what they saw. Intermarriage between 
British and German high society goes all the way to the top; the Royal 
Family themselves were called the Saxe-Coburg-Gothas until they 
changed their name to Windsor at the outbreak of World War I in 1914. 
Germany seemed to be thriving under the man who had abolished 
democracy and declared himself dictator in 1933.140 
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Notorious British socialite Unity Mitford fell under the Nazi spell in the early 
1930s, moving to Germany in 1934.  
Writing to Julius Streicher’s infamous Jew-baiting newspaper Der Stürmer 
in June 1935, she enthused: “England for the English! Out with the Jews! 
With German greeting, Heil Hitler. P.S. Please publish my whole name. I 
want everyone to know that ‘I am a Jew-hater.’ ”141  
As Sykes writes, Mitford is perhaps “entirely symbolic of the shame many of the British 
upper classes [later] felt at their support for Hitler and the Nazis when the war finally 
began. They suddenly realized they had been engaged in something pretty close to 
treason.”142 
Right wing extremism is resolutely anti-communist. Given the Western fears of a 
wide spread communist subversion in the 1930s following the collapse of the Russian 
Empire in 1917, is it not hard to imagine British high society encouraging someone 
staunchly anti-communist and much closer to the Soviets than they were. Still, it was not 
merely the royals or the rich whom were initially captivated by the Nazi way of life. 
Scientists within the British eugenics movement were also encouraged by what they saw 
as positive, decisive action: 
Some were politically right wing and even openly discussed creating 
closer ties to Nazi Germany’s health establishment while associating the 
domestic eugenics movement with anti-Communist and, occasionally, 
anti-Semitic groups. As will be seen, several Eugenics Society figures 
travelled to Germany during the interwar years and reported favourably to 
Society General Secretary C.P. Blacker on the ‘‘eugenic experiment’’ 
taking place there. One former Society officer, later ensconced in the 
IFEO, lectured at German universities on the necessity of worldwide 
eugenic reform and the merits of fascism.143 
As early as 1919, a political party named the Anglo-German Fellowship was 
established to “foster friendship and understanding between Great Britain and 
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Germany.”144 Seemingly irrelevant until 1935, “it was resurrected by those whose fear of 
Bolshevism inclined them to overlook Nazi misdemeanors and to support the Hitler 
regime as a defence [sic] against communism. Others were more directly pro-Nazi.”145 
Many members sought to create business deals and trade agreements between the two 
countries, yet as more of the truth of the Nazi regime’s rule came to light, like the Berlin 
pogrom against Jews on 10 November 1938, many began to leave the fellowship.146 
After the Nazi invasion of Czechoslovakia, the group dissolved following the now fully-
apparent aggressive actions of the Germany leadership.147 
Only one of the pro-Nazi parties in the UK survived beyond the war: “the British 
People’s Party was founded to oppose war with Nazi Germany and to promote radical 
right policies.”148 Party leadership was interred by the British government during the 
war,149 and the party became largely irrelevant after the war ended. It is important to note 
that the British People’s Party “was the only inter-war fascist organization to survive the 
1939–45 conflict.”150 
Perhaps most infamously of the pre-war extreme right parties, the British Union 
of Fascists [BUF] party was founded in 1932 by Sir Oswald Mosley, a recurring figure in 
pre- and post–war Britain.151 Inspired by a visit to fascist ruled Italy in 1932, Mosley 
published a manifesto for the future of Britain undertook to steal large numbers of 
members from other right wing parties in the UK.152 “In terms of his [Mosley’s] political 
ideas and policy in the 1930s, there can be no doubt that he advocated a coherent 
programme [sic] for restricting the political and economic life of Britain. His programme 
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[sic] envisaged the implantation of Empire autarky, and the creation of a totalitarian 
democracy in the shape of the corporate state.”153 Unsurprisingly, the BUF was founded 
on the rhetoric of national pride and a deep suspicion of communism:  
The BUF based its policies on the corporate state, an end to the established 
fixed structure of British politics and on the necessity for an authoritarian 
regime to solve the economic crisis. It was also anti-communist, 
nationalist, and increasingly anti-Semitic.154  
The group was responsible for large and violent clashes with between left wing 
groups and itself between 1933 and 1934. As the party’s popularity waned, it focused 
much more intensely on anti-Semitism and sought to increase violence towards Jewish 
neighborhoods.155 It came to a head in 1937 when a large group of anti-Fascist groups 
came together to opposed the BUF’s demonstrations. 
In what came to be known as the ‘Battle of Cable street,’ this clash led to 
the Public Order act of 1937 which increased police powers to ban 
marches, forbade the wearing of political uniforms and made the use of 
insulting words in public speeches illegal. BUF official anti-Semitism 
reflected the growing influence of Nazism. It [the BUF] changed its 
symbol from the fasces to a lightning flash within a circle and, in 1936, 
changed its name to the British Union of Fascists and National Socialists, 
commonly known as the British Union.156 
Stephen Cullen adds,  
The BUF is seen as Britain’s experience of the European-wide disease of 
fascism and Nazism in the interwar period. As such … the movement is 
still held to possess all the features that are present in the demonology of 
fascism. Foremost amongst these is fascism’s use of political violence. 
Fascism is seen to be a uniquely violent form of politics.157  
The party was largely incapacitated following the internment and incarceration of its 
leaders in 1940 by the British government following the declaration of war, and never 
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fully rose to relevance afterwards, especially following the execution of one of its leaders 
for treason in 1946.158 
Still, as early as the 1940s, but ever more so during the 1950s, there were 
grumblings and deep regrets at the decline and retreat of the British Empire. A few 
notable groups and parties were formed during the 1950s and through the 1970s, among 
them were British Empire Party, which received 1,643 votes in the 1951 UK General 
Election.159 The Union Movement was pioneered by the previously aforementioned Sir 
Oswald Mosely in the 1940s and 1950s, founded on a primarily fascist agenda that 
depended largely on anti-Semitic and anti-Communist views.160 His group was also 
unique in that while it was anti-immigrant and extremely patriotic, Mosley also sought a 
fascist union of sorts with other fascist parties across Europe. The Union Movement’s 
speakers were reminded “to stress the movement’s ‘revolutionary’ credentials, reminding 
their audiences that the UM was ‘anti-Communist,’ but also ‘equally anti-Capitalist.”161 
While his UM party would ultimately fade away by the 1950s, it was important 
for two reasons. First, the UM attempted to capitalize on the fact that  
British Fascism’s limited recovery was provided for by an unforeseen 
external factor: “coloured [sic] immigration.” The consequent 
radicalization of British politics that this development engendered enabled 
British fascism to synthesise [sic] its own culturally pessimistic, racists 
clarion call with the prejudices of the wider polity, thus shortening the 
distance between the fringe and fabric of British society.162  
Second, perhaps more importantly for the purposes of this chapter,  
The UM acted as an ideological conveyor belt transmitting its own 
particularly malignant set of political and cultural idioms across the chasm 
of defeat and despair to a new generation of activists who, confronted with 
more propitious external circumstances, were able to make their own 
conceptions about race, identity , and mass immigration resonant within 
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mainstream debates on the issue, and to reap some electoral benefits, the 
likes of which Moseley could have only dreamed of.163 
Many other groups came and went during the decades after the war: in the 1960s, 
Neo-Nazi parties like the British Movement and The Greater Britain Movement emerged, 
often running on anti-immigrant or anti-Semitic slogans.164 In the 1970s, parties like the 
British Democratic Party and the National Front would emerge with similar mantras,165 
and they would live long enough to have most of its members defect and form the British 
National Party, which endures to this day.  
While nothing incredibly significant was to come of the many fleeting right wing 
groups and parties throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, one major party would 
emerge that would shake up the political landscape of the United Kingdom, for a period 
of time. The 1982 iteration (there had been a previous British National party in the 1940s 
and 1960s166) of the British National Party (BNP) would be the first right-wing extremist 
party to earn meaningful electoral gains in Britain since the end of World War II. 
According to Hill and Bell:  
Over the course of the past two decades, as far-right parties rose to 
prominence on the continent we could congratulate ourselves on having no 
domestic equivalent to the French national Front, Belgium’s Flemish 
Block, Austria’s Freedom party, or Italy’s National Alliance… Since the 
turn of the millennium, however … British society has started to present 
some worrying symptoms of this ‘continental’ illness.167  
They would continue to gain little bits of momentum here and there rose to relative 
prominence in the 2003 local elections, winning 13 council seats.168 Copsey notes, “It 
[the BNP] had outperformed all its predecessors by far.”169  
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The BNP achieved notoriety through a number of ways, including some of its 
controversial slogans, for example, “Rights for Whites,”170 amid the racial tensions and 
riots of 2001 in Northeast Manchester, in Chadderton district. According to Copsey, 
“Intent on creating a political opening, party activists were increasingly drawn to Oldham 
especially when, throughout March and April 2001, inter-racial tensions were brought to 
the boiling point.”171 The situation culminated in skirmishes between militant members 
of the BNP, Pakistani youth, and police and involved bombs and the destruction of a 
soccer field and multiple cars being vandalized and destroyed.172 Following the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, the BNP gained more notoriety and continued to ride high 
on its policies of stopping non-white immigration. For 77 percent of BNP voters, 
immigration was the most important issue facing Britain.173 Going into the 2004 local 
and European elections, expectations were high enough that BNP leadership “was 
confident of obtaining up to several MEPs along with some 50–50 council seats.”174 
According to Copsey, “The party [BNP] received over 800,000 votes in the 2004 
European elections and close to 300,000 in the 2007 local elections.”175  
Wolfreys finishes by outlining the demise and decline of the BNP into a outlier 
party, no longer statistical significant and fraught with economic problems:  
These [electoral] advances, however, were interrupted in 2010 when the 
party failed to win a parliamentary seat (its overall vote rising only 1.8 
percent to 514,819 despite a year of unprecedented media exposure) and 
lost all its representatives in the champ of its flagship council.176  
Indeed, it is hard to foresee the BNP gaining a huge electoral victory soon, especially if it 
“remains ‘the most demonized party in modern British political history.’”177  
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B. UKIP’S OBJECTIVES 
What does UKIP ultimately hope to accomplish? The UKIP markets itself 
primarily as a conservative and highly Eurosceptic party, and by far the primary 
immediate goal is to have the United Kingdom exit the EU. As the UKIP leader Nigel 
Farange has stated: 
The forthcoming debate and referendum about Britain’s membership of 
the European Union is likely to be the defining political decision of this 
generation…In recent weeks and months it has become normal for many 
correspondents to use ‘Europe’ as shorthand for ‘the European Union.’ To 
do so is inaccurate, and suggestive of a general dislike of our continental 
allies, when what Eurosceptics oppose is membership of a supranational 
political organisation.178 
UKIP activist Suzanne Evans echoes Farange’s reasoning, writing:  
UKIP isn’t embarrassed by patriotism or by being British. We believe our 
nation can be a force for good and that our country has developed social 
and civic values over the last thousand years which should be celebrated, 
preserved and build upon. This is the philosophy at the heart of all UKIP 
policies … and principles… We do believe the British way of life is 
fundamentally good and worth saving. This is why our foremost policy is 
withdrawal from the European Union.179 
Leaving the EU is a central pillar of the UKIP’s identity. “Given that UKIP are 
even more intensely Eurosceptic than most of their European cousins, and operate in one 
of the most Eurosceptic countries in the EU,”180 it is not a far stretch of the imagination 
to figure a large measure of support for UKIP can be attributed to Eurosceptic British 
citizens. In fact, Ford and Goodwin go so far as to say that being Eurosceptic is “so 
universal, and so central to the party’s identity, that it is better seen as a necessary 
condition for considering a UKIP vote: 95 per cent of UKIP voters disapprove of 
Britain’s EU membership.”181 
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In line with the extreme right’s standard view on individual countries’ well-being 
being prioritized, a key criticism by UKIP of the EU is that over time, being a member of 
the EU has only resulted in Britain’s sovereignty and independence being eroded.182 
There are a number of causes that the party attributes to the alleged degradation of 
sovereignty. The inability to negotiate trade deals between Britain and commonwealth 
countries, which are of course not in the EU, is thus a large source of anguish for the 
Euroskeptics.183  
Linked with the EU’s trade policies, UKIP targets the immigration policies of the 
EU. UKIP of course advocates the withdrawal and exit from the EU. By doing this, the 
party vows to  
take back control of our [British] borders, put a five year moratorium on 
immigration on unskilled workers, … introduce an Australian-style points 
based system to manage the number and skills of people coming into the 
country, … [and] tackle the problem of sham marriages.184  
UKIP would also end multiculturalism in Britain if it came to power. A quote from the 
2015 UKIP manifesto explains:  
We reject multiculturalism, the doctrine whereby different ethnic and 
religious groups are encouraged to maintain all aspects of their cultures, 
instead of integrating into our majority culture, even if some of their 
values and customs conflict with British ones. We believe 
multiculturalism has led to an alarming fragmentation of British 
society.185  
Ultimately, UKIP’s two prime objectives are: ceasing certain kinds of 
immigration while radically changing the way immigration is handled in the UK (read 
another way: undoing and removing the EU’s policy of free movement among EU 
citizens within EU countries) and banishing the EU’s oversight and outside influence into 
Britain’s affairs by exiting the EU altogether.  
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C. DEMOGRAPHICS 
The UKIP support base does not differ largely from the stereotypical extreme 
right demographics: Mostly white, conservative, and middle to lower class citizens who 
have major issues with immigration and the EU at large. As Elise Rietveld writes, “UKIP 
draws its core support from working class men from a Conservative background who are 
financially insecure and read tabloid newspapers, but also appeals more widely 
particularly in European elections.”186 
Ford and Goodwin speak to the demographics of the UKIP support base:  
Looking to the examples of more successful insurgents [extreme right-
wing political parties across Europe], the party finally embraced the 
fundamentals of party-building: the need to establish local bastions of 
support; to invest in parliamentary by-elections; to establish a clear target 
electoral market; to fuse their Eurosceptic message with an anti-
immigration appeal; and to exploit the weakness of the main parties and 
other, rival insurgents.187 
Richard Seymour writes of the UKIP support base:  
The share of the vote for both Labour and the Conservatives barely altered 
between 2010 (29 per cent and 36.1 per cent, respectively) and 2015 (30.4 
per cent and 36.9 per cent). UKIP, however, increased its vote from 3.1 
per cent to 12.6 per cent. Deploying a political strategy which I will call 
“counter-transformism,” UKIP consolidated the right wing, energized it, 
hardened its positions, polarized the debate to the right, and kept a weak 
Labour leadership on the defensive. With the petty bourgeoisie as its 
bedrock, UKIP assembled an impressive, cross-class coalition, with 
moderate advances into the Liberal and Labour vote.188 
UKIP has been able to successfully merge domestic concerns with association and 
dissatisfaction with Brussels’ political establishment and management of the EU. Ford 
and Goodwin write that “Across Europe, academics have traced support for radical right 
parties that are similar to UKIP to four particularly important movies: Euroscepticism; 
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hostility towards immigration; populist dissatisfaction with established parties; and a 
pessimistic and dissatisfied outlook on life.”189  
Positioning UKIP as an outsider party that will fight for the common citizens is a 
strong selling point for the party. As Martin and Smith write,  
Despite Farage’s privileged lifestyle and support of the same neoliberal 
economic politics that the other major political parties are signed-up for, 
his constant presentation of himself as an outsider unfairly excluded by a 
members-only establishment club taps into this sense of unfair exclusion 
from the political discussion.190  
This portrayal of Farange has aided in supporters of UKIP perceiving that it is for 
the common Englishman. 
Ford, Goodwin and Cutts write: 
Examining vote-switching between first- and second-order elections 
evidence is found of a distinction between two types of supporter: more 
affluent and middle-class ‘strategic ‘defectors’ from the main-stream 
Conservative Party who support UKIP to register their Euroscepticism, 
and more economically marginal and politically disaffected ‘core 
loyalists’ who are attracted to UKIP by its anti-immigration rhetoric and 
populist anti-establishment strategy. UKIP also succeeds in attracting core 
support from groups such as women who have traditionally rejected 
extreme right parties such as the BNP.191  
Between reinventing the message of the extreme right and changing the electoral 
strategies for gaining votes, UKIP’s leadership will seek to continue making inroads into 
the political mainstream. 
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IV. THE ALTERNATIVE FÜR DEUTSCHLAND 
Cited by some as “Germany’s UKIP,”192 AfD was only recently established—in 
2013—yet has quickly become a new wrinkle in the resurgent right-wing extremist 
movement across Europe’s political landscape. It was the first anti-Euro party to gain a 
seat in the German parliament, winning several others since its founding in 2013.193 A 
leadership change in the summer of 2015 now has the party’s rhetoric focused on closing 
Germany’s borders to further immigration from Syria and the Middle East, while also 
maintaining the call to leave the Eurozone. This chapter surveys the post-war political 
landscape in Germany regarding the extreme right’s popularity, what the AfD’s goals are, 
and who supports it.  
A. THE FAR RIGHT IN THE FRG 
Following the defeat of the Nazi regime in 1945, the voelkisch brand of radical 
and violent nationalism in Germany was physically destroyed and politically bankrupt. 
The occupying powers banned the NSDAP and purged public life of Nazis, though this 
purge was incomplete and laden with contradictions. In the FRG, in particular, laws were 
put into place following 1945 in order to ban the use of the Nazi symbol, speech, and 
other “unconstitutional” methods that would support hatred.194 This effort formed part of 
the program of both the German government and the victorious allies root out Nazi 
thought and organization: “German politics denied the existence of a xenophobic far-
right movement for many years in order to be accepted by the international community 
and to silence any discussion of the continuation of Nazi elites in post-war Germany.”195  
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Yet, the far right in the FRG resurfaced as various nationalist parties that had a 
very mixed experience. The first party to be banned under the West German law was the 
Socialist Reich Party (SRP), in 1952.196 This party had attracted many former Nazi 
members and experienced mild successes in elections prior to being banned as the allied 
powers exercised significant influence in the young FRG.197 For the rest of the 1950s, the 
far right did not achieve much success in Germany, since many Nazis were recycled and 
thus de-weaponized, in contrast to the Weimar record in the 1920s. For one thing, Article 
131 was added to Federal German constitution, the Basic Law, in 1951:  
This opened the floodgates for those officials of the Third Reich to return 
to similar posts within the Federal Republic and functioned as a 
neutralizing force by integrating what could have constituted a potential 
reservoir of far right support into the structure of the Federal Republic.198  
It was clear by 1960s that the extreme right was not dead though; instead, it had 
been merely passive. The National Democratic Party (NPD) was formed out of the shell 
of fractured far-right groups and by former Nazis.199 As the leader of NPD stated, the 
party would “serve as a haven for all the shipwrecked right-wing splinter groups and 
attract the dissatisfied of all classes in Western Germany to whom a strongly nationalist 
and authoritarian policy would appeal.”200 Though it began very small with only 2 
percent of the general vote in 1965, with the onset of recession in the mid-1960s and a 
grand coalition government, the NPD achieved almost 10 percent by 1968 in a few 
German states.201 Some called this development an “indicator of symptoms of crisis in 
the democracy,”202 in which skeptics were convinced that the Bonn government would 
go the way of the first German democracy. This surge in popularity can likely be 
attributed in part to the economic problems that befell the Germans in 1966–67, which is 
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typical of many far right-wing groups. Once a new social liberal coalition formed, the 
NPD performed disastrously in the 1969 elections, amid internal fighting that crippled the 
party’s influence until the end of the century.  
Various other small populist and extreme right parties formed in the later 1970s 
and mid-1980s, but none were as serious contenders in the political arena as Die 
Republikaner and the Deutsche Volksunion. From 1989 to 1995, the group succeeded in 
gaining entry into multiple German state legislatures.203 According to Jaschke,  
their platform included anti-immigrant policies, a tough stance on crime, 
and a rejection of what was seen as failed government policies in general. 
Franz Schoenhuber, their leader … can be compared to other European 
right-wing populist leaders such as Jean-Marie Le Pen.204  
Absorbing voters who were dissatisfied with the mainstream conservative parties, Die 
Republikaner fell apart in 1995 due to infighting and in large part because mainstream 
parties had adopted some of Die Republikaner’s rhetoric.205 
Approaching and following reunification with East and West Germany, populist 
groups targeted the East Germans, where a very different electorate existed, and whose 
attitudes about nation and Europe differed greatly from that of the FRG in the 1980s. The 
labor market in East Germany tried to cope with the large-scale overhaul of the economy 
in the unification process, as “old industrial structures were transformed into modern, 
service-oriented companies that required skilled workers. Unemployment rates kept 
growing and left parts of the former working class behind.”206 This dislocation created a 
disgruntled and dissatisfied swath of young unskilled men, persons who were perfect 
candidates for the far right’s overtures. Jaschke argues that 
although anti-fascism had been an official doctrine of the East German 
regime, it had no deep roots in the everyday life of society and people’s 
minds. At the same time, xenophobic attitudes, anti-Semitism, and 
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authoritarian beliefs had always been part of the so-called socialist 
society.207  
The extreme right served as a domain for the “social losers of reunification by 
giving political and ideological support for militant action.”208 The GDR had boasted a 
neo Nazi underground, tolerated by the regime, because of the impossibility of stamping 
it out. The GDR, too, had recycled Nazis in the 1950s and, in many cases, had recycled 
Nazi organizations with a hammer and sickle badge, which could do little to cover up the 
integral nationalist core ideas. 
At this point, the extreme right split into three distinct branches, radicalizing in 
the process. First, there were the violence-oriented militants.209 These groups were 
compromised of neo-Nazis and skinheads, of which the latter culture was transplanted 
from the United Kingdom. These typically young white men were used by the NPD to 
cause harm to anyone who did not fit in with their worldview.210 This localized violence 
had become routine enough to the point that between 1990 and 2010, “some east German 
locations were generally considered to be no-go areas for visitors from abroad and 
domestic, especially dark-skinned minorities.”211 The second category is the intellectual 
branch, which Jaschke calls the New Right.212 This, in reality, was an evolution of the 
old right, but in a new package. Schellenberg notes, 
They share a rejection of the ideas of the French Revolution: freedom, 
equality, and solidarity. They blame those ideas for what they view as the 
decline of politics, society, values, and the traditional German ways of 
life. The New Right attacks democracy and liberalism, fighting for a 
strong state, rejection immigration and multicultural societies.213  
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Third, the national-conservative branch laid the foundation for later populist 
groups like the Republicans and German People’s Union to emerge.214 Schellenberg 
writes that these two groups were formed out of dissatisfaction with the Christian 
Democratic Union/Christian Social Union as it became more centrist and inclusive of 
socialist ideas and practices.215 
In the shadow of the Nazi past, the far right in Germany can never escape 
domestic and international suspicion, for it is seemingly forever linked to fascism and 
Hitler. The extreme right has not polled especially well in recent elections, but given the 
wave of far right growth and the surge in popularity across Europe in general, this 
situation may well change. Laws may ban overtly fascist parties, but militant activists 
maintain high crime rates targeted at foreigners or minorities.216 This persistence must 
remain a cause for deep concern going forward for the German political elite.  
B. AFD’S OBJECTIVES 
More in the sense of the Lucke wing,  
The AfD strives for an EU of sovereign states supporting human rights, 
democracy, the values of the Christian West, selective integration, 
subsidiarity, competition, and the rule of law. It is against excessive EU 
centralism, bureaucracy, dirigisme and a common currency that leads to 
rescuing incompetent banks, to frustrated jobless young people and to 
minimal pensions.217  
So begins the 2014 AfD preamble in its European elections manifesto. The primary goal 
of the AfD is to ensure all states in the EU are eligible to be removed from the Euro 
currency, either by their own choice or by ouster from the other EU member states. As 
the party states in its European election manifesto: “The EU is threatened by the single 
currency euro: Presently, committees lacking adequate democratic legitimacy issue 
regulations with the status of law and establish institutions that lack any kind of 
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parliamentary control.”218 An article from Deutsche Welle states a similar analysis of the 
party’s primary purpose: “The AfD’s central argument is that the euro is a failed currency 
that threatens the European Union’s future by supporting impoverished countries and 
uncompetitive economies, which in turn burdens future generations.”219  
The apparent fragility of the euro has been put into sharp focus over the past two 
years with the crippling Greek debt threatening to sink the currency. This development is 
made worse in German politics by the noisy nostalgia of a certain group of Germans for 
the Deutsche Mark in its glory years as the emblem of a prosperous and stable West 
Germany, which has now vanished into the mists of time. The German government has 
given several bailout loans to the Greeks and there is a profound concern within the AfD 
leadership that this crisis could do irreparable damage to the Germany economy. The 
AfD has gone so far as to create an entire manifesto dedicated to the Greek debt crisis 
alone, citing in it many concerns regarding “internal devaluation”220 of the Euro. From 
the AfD’s Greek recovery manifesto:  
[AfD] Condemns the present situation in which European taxpayers are 
forced to prop up a failed currency union, prolonging the suffering of 
Greek society. Such a policy does not have any economic or moral 
justification. [AfD] Underscores that Germany cannot be expected to 
lower its competitiveness to solve the Eurozone crisis, and that ‘internal 
devaluation’ cannot improve the competitiveness of Greece.221  
The document stresses that the AfD does not endorse nor desire a total “Grexit” from the 
EU, however, as there are other successful countries in the EU but not members of the 
Eurozone currency.222 This position contrasts with the UKIP’s primary reason for 
existence—Britain’s exit from the EU entirely. 
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Similarly to UKIP, AfD is for expanded restrictions on the movement of people 
between EU countries. The 2015 immigration crisis has only served to highlight and 
reinforce the party’s stance in this regard, and the polls support this measure: “Support 
for the Alternative for Germany (AfD) … has risen to its highest level in nearly four 
months as an influx of refugees from the Middle East gathers pace.”223 The party has 
continued to feed off the increased anxiety of immigrants, specifically those from 
Syria.224 
The party absolutely maintains its commitment to leave the Eurozone, but recent 
discussions have shifted the party much more into the realm of xenophobia. As a result, 
Lucke has severed ties with AfD. His departure will likely allow the AfD’s new 
leadership to pursue further emphasis on border control than it would have with Lucke 
present in the party, especially with growing concerns over possibly one million migrants 
on pace to enter the EU in 2015.225 The party is also apt to continue its vaguely pro-
Russian and less vaguely anti-American development.226 
C. DEMOGRAPHICS 
At the party’s foundation in 2013, the AfD was labeled by critics in the grand 
coalition as a fringe group; originally “[AfD] was derided as the ‘professors’ party’ and 
dismissed by Chancellor Angela Merkel.”227 The group consisted of dissatisfied and 
nationalist economists and other professionals who would have seemed to be prime 
candidates to prosper in the EU’s Eurozone setup, but instead came together to form a 
group with the purpose of making Germany leave the euro behind. The group was soon 
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credited by some observers as the first legitimate conservative alternative to Merkel’s 
Christian Democrat (CDU) party, taking away votes from the CDU/CSU in 2014.228  
The initial demographic make-up of the party in 2013 and 2014 is worth noting 
because it stands in contrast to the typical extreme-right support described in Chapter 2. 
Too focused on skin heads and old Hitler Youth leaders in their dotage, the respectable 
veneer of the educated middle class led to the confusion of political observers. Of course, 
middle class and educated support for Nazis had been prominent in a past that was now 
essentially forgotten. As Jaschke writes, “Non-acceptance of immigration and prejudice 
toward immigrants are common values of right-wing voters in Europe. This electorate 
mainly consists of younger males on a low skill and education level. Most of them are 
laborers or unemployed.”229 The AfD started out as something rather different, though 
the party’s demographics have begun to morph slightly in the past year. With the change 
in leadership, some have written that AfD “has shed its academic gown, becoming more 
grass-roots and overtly nationalist, and is focusing all its efforts on opposing Angela 
Merkel’s asylum policy.”230 This development has significant implications for its support 
base going forward, as it would seem much easier to get those already leery of 
immigrants riled up to a cause that directly confronts that issue than getting supporters to 
march over the finer details of Eurozone policies. 
Tied with the shift toward a more radical right-wing philosophy is the struggle for 
Petry to attempt to maintain the projection that the AfD is not overtly far-right and 
instead moderate. With the rise of the mass movement PEGIDA in Saxony in 2014, this 
argument is proving extremely difficult as ever more of the far-right’s supports flock to 
the AfD from other fringe or banned parties, some of whose speakers “are increasingly 
radical right-wing, because they use hate and semantics that is certainly close to neo-Nazi 
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vocabulary.”231 One of the AfD’s most significant spokesmen, the new broom 
Thuringian schoolteacher Björn Höcke, has been quoted as saying he wanted “1,000 
years of Germany!”232 This statement was offered in the same tones as Joseph Goebbels 
on German national television and in several of his public speeches, leaving many 
commentators and analysts weary of the AfD’s motivations in light of his “Nazi era”233 
choice of words. In a very real way, he represents some of the newer blood to have 
entered into the AfD with the appointment of Petry as party boss. Ben Knight continues 
his analysis of AfD’s membership: 
Since the unceremonious ouster in July [2015] of the previous leader and 
founder Bernd Lucke, who represented the euroskeptic liberal economist 
element of the party, the AfD has been reduced to two wings - the middle-
class nationalist conservative wing, represented by Frauke Petry, and the 
far-right radicals, represented by Höcke, which is rapidly leeching voters 
from the NPD and among PEGIDA demonstrators.234 
According to Knight, this is the AfD’s strategy—maintain two kinds of rhetoric to attract 
both middle-right and extreme-right supporters to gain votes. This policy also mobilizes 
the underground skin head bullies, whose assassination attempt against a candidate for 
mayor in Cologne, in addition to the upswing in acts of violence against asylum seekers, 
has been more than noteworthy.235 Given the uncertainty of the immigration situation 
across Europe at large and in particular France and Germany, this will likely continue to 
be the AfD strategy until the next national election in 2017.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Germany’s Nazi past reduced extreme right-wing parties in West Germany to the 
fringe, where for long they hid behind a conservative “national pride” agenda. In East 
Germany, ring-wing movements only materialized in the 1980s in the form of skinheads, 
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but no formal parties formed due to the communist rule there up until 1989. As time 
marched on, far-right parties never entered the political mainstream in Germany, though 
that may be changing, as societal sentiments regarding disillusionment and frustration 
with Eurozone policies increases—not only in Germany but across Europe. As the civil 
war rages and generally austere conditions persist in the Levant and North Africa, 
refugees continue to pour into EU countries, causing ever more limelight to be placed on 
policies and public relief to be given to them; this in turn provides the perfect fodder to 
grow the ranks of the extreme right, and AfD, like so many other far-right parties in 
Europe, are benefitting because of their border control proposals. Should the AfD see 
major gains in the future and enter into the political mainstream in Germany, it would be 
expected to see a major effort to leave the Eurozone, which would likely doom the euro 
as a currency. In the long run, it may result in closer ties between Russia and Germany, 




What are the implications for European politics and U.S. security policy in 
Europe with the further expansion of populist and radical right wing politics in two key 
U.S. allies? Bremmer expresses what could be the worst case scenario for the United 
States should the far right claim victory in a major EU member: 
Economic sanctions against Russia, imposed by the U.S. and E.U. after 
Moscow’s Crimea grab, have made matters worse, because they cost 
Europe much more than American sanctions cost the U.S.—Russia is 
America’s 23rd largest trade partner, but Europe’s third. The effects are felt 
most sharply in key economic sectors: France’s defense industry, the 
German and Italian energy sectors and British finance. But Die Welt 
reports that sanctions on Russia could eventually cost Europe $114 billion 
and up to 2 million jobs. According to E.U. law, the imposition of 
sanctions must be unanimous across all 28 member states; that’s a big 
problem. Vladimir Putin has two missions in Syria. The first is to prop up 
his ally Bashar Assad and protect Russia’s foothold in the Middle East. 
The second is to persuade Europeans that Russia can help stabilize Syria, 
halting the flow of refugees into Europe. There are already plenty of 
European governments and countries that want to see the sanctions lapse. 
And all Putin needs is one far-right party to assume power and decide that 
their country’s economic well-being is more important than punishing 
Russia. That would further undermine European unity and create a new 
source of tension in U.S.-European relations at a time when a new trans-
Atlantic trade deal might revive Europe’s longer-term economic 
potential.236 
Thus, a widespread far right victory poses a threat to the U.S. organized Atlantic security 
order since 1945, which has relied on a moderate political culture and party landscape 
unlike that of interwar Europe, especially after 1930, in which the middle class in much 
of Europe embraced fascism and revisionism. What with the enduring economic 
problems, as well as the role of terrorism after the Paris fall 2015 assault and the Russian 
threat to the status quo, the extreme-right is now a feature of the political world. The 
threat is real, given the multitude of problems facing the EU as “the extreme right parties 
have rearranged and reaffirmed themselves in the last 20 years,”237 through various 
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problems ranging from economic pain with Greece, to Russian trade embargos harming 
EU members, to the very real immigration flood and the EU’s apparent inability to 
appropriately handle the problem: “For far-right parties across the continent, 
mismanagement of the Greek crisis is proof positive that the E.U. is a net negative for 
any country not named Germany.”238 
Ever more a voice in the wilderness, Habermas voices his despair of a pluralist 
and postmodern pan-European identity taking hold at this stage of the EU, writing: 
“Elites … cling to the established mode of intergovernmental decision-making so that 
they do not need to concern themselves with a normative integration of citizens that 
would first make possible the pursuit of common goals across national boundaries.”239 
He points out that as the EU membership encroaches on Europe’s East, member countries 
will have to share resources further and “active political interventions will be necessary 
to bridge the gaps in socio-economic development between the old and new 
members.”240 The pie can only get so big, and everyone wants a slice—between the 
poorer Southern countries, flooded with immigration and unemployment, and the newly 
minted Eastern members,241 the EU has spread itself thin. The struggle ultimately lies, as 
Habermas argues, between those who argue for the nation-state as a primary participant 
in international affairs and those who push for a solution past the state level.242 It appears 
unlikely that the EU countries work towards a common identity while each state tries to 
push for an increasingly better deal on its own. 
Roger Eatwell speculates further about what a lack of confidence in the system 
may do to the European Union’s political processes of consensus and small steps: 
As long as the communist “evil empire” existed, Western democracy 
could in an important sense define itself by the “Other.” Following the 
collapse of the … Soviet empire, the spotlight has turn inward, towards 
democracy’s basic principles and linked socioeconomic structures. What 
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exactly does international “multi-level governance” mean in terms of 
democracy? Such new institutions may seek to protect (liberal) democracy 
in terms of rights, but they officer little or no possibility for (direct) 
democratic participation. These arguments clearly point to the growing 
possibility of constructing a legitimate discourse which is critical of the 
system rather than just of mainstream parties. This is turn may affect voter 
attitudes. The proportion of authoritarians within the extremist 
constituency may well grow if democratic legitimacy declines… serious 
national or sectoral crises … could dramatically reduce trust in the 
system.243  
A lack of “trust in the system”244 would only de-legitimize a common European political 
identity, as countries would bow to a noisy nationalist electorate and turn its back on the 
federative policy, seeking self-interest first. One hardly needs to recall that this process 
marked the evolution from 1919 until 1930 with disastrous results 
If other government benefits and subsidies to the public were to be cut in the 
midst of such a catastrophe, the door would be open for parties like UKIP or AfD to 
come to power and enact a nationalist and anti-pluralist agenda. These parties and parties 
like them across Europe will not go away anytime soon. Regardless of seemingly 
outrageous statements that are decried as politically incorrect, racist, or too simple, these 
parties must not simply be cast aside or chalked up as simply racist extremists. Anyone 
concerned with U.S. security and defense in the midst of the present crisis is enjoined to 
study and analyze these trends if they are to be understood and countered. Especially 
meaningful are “the ways in which alienation, ineffective representation, and a decisive 
disconnection of citizens from government are perceived and expressed on local levels 
remains an important area for continual attention,”245 because it will shed light into how 
these groups market themselves and gain votes. For the United States, it is imperative we 
understand where, how, and when these parties gain victories in our allies’ countries.  
The core assumptions of U.S. power relies to a large extent on its alliance system, 
of which the UK and the FRG are the heart of NATO, as well as a part of an economic 
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order of open markets in Europe and Asia that are the basis of American prosperity. 
Nationalist and xenophobic parties in western Europe represent a retrograde process to a 
dangerous and troubled future, the impact of al Qaeda and ISIS notwithstanding. Putin’s 
Russia has well recognized the opportunities for ideological adventure in western and 
central Europe proffered by the 2008 crisis as well as the stalemate of U.S. military 
power in the Middle East and the ensuing retrenchment and pivot to Asia. A political 
earthquake in London and Berlin might well cause these nations to move away from the 
United States and closer to Russia. If the extreme right begins to win consistent and 
significant victories, it would likely signal the failure of a common postmodern European 
political identity to emerge beyond that of a fuzzy concept, unable to materialize anything 
more concrete than what it is today. A UKIP-led Britain seems remote in 2015, but then 
again, they were considered merely “fruitcakes”246 a decade ago. AfD was founded only 
in 2013 yet the political gains have been consistent in the face of crises that few foresaw 
and the mastery of which has proven as challenging as the crises of the early and mid-20th 
century. The populist challenge to Merkel on the immigrant crisis has continued to propel 
the party’s popularity in the public’s discourse over the topic. Given time and more 
members, there is a distinct threat that AfD makes a legitimate inroad in German politics. 
Failure to take the far right’s surge seriously, and more importantly, the issues with which 
those parties are using to make electoral gains, will only result in a further erosion of the 
status quo and a potential destabilization of the political system in Europe.  
The role of domestic politics in the formulation of external policy might be 
doubted by certain theorists of political science, but for anyone concerned with the real 
forces that make for security policy in a democracy; these domestic forces are real and 
significant. Makers of policy today can ill afford any nostalgia about special relationships 
and a mythical sharing of the burden when the actual situation suggests a disintegration 
of essentials of policy as concerns the UK and the FRG. An epoch of growing 
radicalization in one theater of U.S. security policy has a knock on effect in another, 
which, wrongly, too many have regarded as a given, as a thing to be taken for granted. 
This examination of the role of nationalism and right wing mass politics in the new 
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century offers an important piece of the mosaic of policy and commends itself to the 
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